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Abstract: This paper is a reply to Gus diZerega’s essay on the nature, scope and ambition of spontaneous order studies. I am in 
broad agreement with diZerega’s claims and so I will seek neither rebuttal, nor restatement. Instead, I want to argue some dif-
ferent points of emphasis in the spontaneous order research program. Specifically, I argue that emergent social order should be 
studied as an application and indeed exemplar of the evolutionary theory of rule-based co-operation.
Keywords: Spontaneous order; complexity; economic evolution; Hayek; rules
1: INTRODUCTION
This essay is a response to Gus diZerega’s engaging, thought-
ful and wide-ranging survey of the subject domain of 
spontaneous order studies and of the various analytic and 
methodological approaches within its ambit. The launch 
of a new scholarly outlet for the study of emergent social 
phenomena is an ideal opportunity to engage in such pur-
pose and reflections. I want to pick up some themes and 
challenges that diZerega has posed, and push them along 
a little further. This essay will develop the analytic frame-
work that diZerega has proposed, but I will seek to steer 
these arguments in a particular direction, namely toward a 
study of evolving rule-systems for distributed co-operation. 
Specifically, I argue that the most overarching source of 
spontaneous order in any social system is imitation, or the 
copying of rules. This produces co-operation and evolution, 
which in the social sciences are the proper focal points for 
the study of spontaneous order.
Like any relatively new science1 spontaneous order stud-
ies is still very much in the ‘collecting’ phase of gathering to-
gether instances of spontaneous orders, and of gathering and 
auditioning methods and tools for their study. Its research 
program is still advancing through the following templates 
—‘X is (also) a spontaneous-order domain’; and ‘Y is (also) 
a spontaneous-order theorist’. My purpose in this essay is 
not to add another X or Y—for I do that elsewhere, with X = 
Innovation and Y = Elinor Ostrom and Deirdre McCloskey 
(Potts, 2012). Instead, I seek here to build on diZerega’s sur-
vey with some particular refinements and points of empha-
sis. 
Many sciences develop by the differential contribu-
tions of ‘lumpers and splitters’.2 Lumpers see in advance the 
bringing of things together that may appear different, so 
that overarching patterns and similarities may be revealed. 
Spontaneous-order theory, it would seem, is dominated by 
lumpers. Splitters seek to make sub-classifications to high-
light different mechanisms and to make sense of new data. 
Mature sciences tend to be dominated by splitters. I want to 
do both some lumping and some splitting. 
The lumping is in respect of the theory of co-operation: 
I want to lump spontaneous order studies—and the study 
of emergent social phenomena generally—with the study of 
co-operation. This often sits below the surface. Yet the study 
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of spontaneous orders can benefit from having this in plain 
view. It also helps reveal intriguing questions that are other-
wise ill-framed: such as why spontaneous orders are often so 
hard to see, or why we so readily attribute design or inten-
tion to the complex order they produce when there is none. 
This also helps frame the classical ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ 
sense of spontaneous orders as a species of what we might 
think of as unintended co-operation. 
The splitting is in respect of the mechanisms of spon-
taneous orders. I want to make the case that there are two 
broad and distinct mechanisms at work in a spontaneous 
order—complex networks (adaptation) and evolution (copy-
ing)—and while they are often seen together, they are in 
fact different mechanisms and processes. The research pro-
gram of spontaneous order studies benefits from splitting 
them. On the one hand there are spontaneous orders made 
of complex information networks that facilitate the use of 
distributed information and knowledge through signals and 
adaptation. A classic example is F. A. Hayek’s (1945) essay on 
the price mechanism ‘The use of knowledge in society’. On 
the other hand, there are spontaneous orders that emerge 
though differential rule copying, as through an evolutionary 
process that results in the change of population structures. A 
classic example is F. A. Hayek’s (1973) theory of cultural evo-
lution, which might well have been called ‘the use of society 
in knowledge’. There are several reasons to emphasize this 
split. One is that they draw on different theoretical and ana-
lytic foundations (viz. complexity and network theory ver-
sus evolutionary theory). Another is that while networks are 
essentially about information dynamics, evolution is about 
rule dynamics.
This lumping and splitting helps us to see the relation 
between spontaneous orders and civil societies, which is 
the theme of Part III of diZerega’s essay, where he argues 
that Jane Jacobs’ work is more in the manner of civil soci-
ety rather than of spontaneous order, and that civil societies 
are analogous to social ecosystems. I want to step back from 
the social ecosystem metaphor and argue that civil society is 
what happens when we have both sorts of dynamics: namely, 
information networks and the emergence and evolution of 
rules.3 But these differences in emphasis should not detract 
from the overarching agreement. 
Gus diZerega has proposed a broad map of the elements 
of the study of spontaneous order and the range of its ap-
plications (see also diZerega, 2008). Studies of spontaneous 
order have a wide compass. There are multiple definitions 
and meanings, many accepted methods, and an inclusive 
attitude to membership. But to progress much beyond a 
broad-church concept it will need to refine its definitions 
and sharpen its focus. This new journal is an instrument in 
the effort to do that. Toward that end, I want to make the 
case that spontaneous-order studies can be usefully framed 
as the study of the rules by which co-operation evolves.
2: INVISIBLE HANDS & EVOLVED MINDS
But before we get to that, consider a basic reason why the 
study of spontaneous orders is hard, namely that we seem 
instinctively predisposed not to see emergent unintentional 
order. We tend to overwrite it with intention and design.   
The concept of an emergent or spontaneous order has 
been a part of inquiries into the human, natural and social 
sciences at least since the writings of the Scottish moral 
philosophers (Barry 1982). In 1714 we find in Bernard 
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees a story of ‘private vices and 
public virtues’. The concept of ‘the invisible hand’ is in Adam 
Smith’s History of Astronomy (1749), in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1756) and in the Wealth of Nations (1776). In 
1782, Adam Ferguson wrote in History of Civil Society of 
social order as ‘the result of human action, but not the exe-
cution of any human design’. The abstract idea of a spontane-
ous order has long been recognized as central to the study of 
human society, the growth of knowledge, and the economy. 
These deep eighteenth-century insights catalysed fur-
ther recognition of the domain of spontaneous orders as al-
ternative explanations of the appearance of design. Perhaps 
most famously this occurred in Charles Darwin’s theory 
of evolution by natural selection—still a classic argument 
against design—but eventually leading to the modern sci-
ence of complex adaptive systems and of emergent order. 
Nevertheless, the core of the analytic idea of a spontaneous 
order that developed through the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries can be claimed to have centred on the concept of 
a market or institutional price mechanism (as in the work of 
Carl Menger, for example) as an information-processing sys-
tem that co-ordinates the distributed actions of individuals, 
and which results in an overall pattern of order or cosmos, 
a term that Hayek (1979) highlighted in Chapter 2 of Law, 
Legislation and Liberty. This spontaneous order emerged 
from a parallel process of mutual feedback and local adapta-
tion, co-ordinated through price signals. 
The study of the spontaneous order of culture, economy 
and society has developed across a number of domains: spe-
cifically, through what Ludwig von Mises called a catallaxy 
in relation to the economic order; what Hayek called ‘the 
Great Society’ and ‘the extended order’;4 what Karl Popper 
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called ‘the Open Society’ in relation to the classical liberal 
polity; what Michael Polanyi called the spontaneous order of 
the enterprise of science; and in the study of the equilibrat-
ing tendencies of the price system (e.g. in the work of Leonid 
Hurwicz, although not in that of Kenneth Arrow). These ad-
vances have helped us to see the range of where spontaneous 
orders exist and provide insight into the mechanisms and 
processes by which they work. Gus diZerega, in his opening 
essay, proposes several other key contributors and domains, 
including Jane Jacobs on cities, Thomas Kuhn on scientific 
revolutions and Evelyn Fox Keller on slime moulds. A reg-
ister of additional domains of spontaneous-order studies ex-
tends well beyond market economies and reaches into the 
study of, for example: law (Hayek, 1967); language (Pinker, 
1995; Habermas, 1998); democracy (Scott, 1998; diZerega, 
1989); religion (Andersson, 2010); the family (Horwitz, 
2005); and arts and literary production (Camplin, 2010; 
Cantor and Cox, 2010).
It is noteworthy that spontaneous orders are both very 
common5—they are in an important sense all about us, as 
the above list illustrates—and yet are nevertheless very dif-
ficult to see, in the sense that we must overcome a ‘nativ-
ist’ perception that these are the result of a designed order. 
Specifically, it is difficult to see complex structures and sys-
tems—such as families, cities, science, economies and so on 
—as not being designed or planned, both because of their 
apparent complexity and because they are seemingly co-op-
erative systems or outcomes. It is hard to see them as spon-
taneous orders. 
Consider why this is. First, you can’t see them directly. 
They have to be statistically constructed so that the ordered 
patterns become apparent. But there is a further difficulty 
that acts against the grain of any analytic exploration. The 
problem is that our brains seem wired as if to actively filter 
out or misconstrue spontaneous orders. This is not simply a 
problem of rational ignorance about how economic systems 
work (Caplan, 2006). Instead, it would seem to be the case 
that the human perceptual and classificatory apparatus has 
evolved in such a way as to instinctively misconstrue spon-
taneous orders as either purely natural—as exogenous or 
unintended—or as entirely artificial—as endogenous and 
intentional. Under this hypothesis, we have a cognitive blind 
spot in respect of order that is both endogenous (caused by 
human action) and unintentional (not by human design). 
The human brain (and probably other organisms too) 
has trouble with endogenous forces and processes in the so-
cial realm that are unintentional. Endogenous-Intentional 
covers the range of artificial or rational operations (see 
Figure 1 below). Exogenous-Unintentional is the realm 
of the natural. Exogenous-Intentional is the mystical. But 
Endogenous-Unintentional is problematic: we more or less 
filter it out. But that invisible world is the realm of spontane-
ous orders.  
Figure 1: System-agency in attribution of order
Intentional Unintentional
Exogenous Mystical Natural
Endogenous Artificial/Rational Spontaneous  Order
The invisibility of spontaneous order has the perverse 
effect of generating demand for hierarchically imposed 
forces to defeat the latent anarchy of the Hobbesian social 
‘state of nature’ with the artificial creation of centralized 
governance. The tendency to see a mystical basis of society 
is perhaps deep in the human psyche and instinct, and the 
modern mind has developed to replace this with an attribu-
tion that oscillates instead between natural and artificial. But 
it would appear that there is a similar tendency to neglect the 
possibility of spontaneous order. They may simply not see it, 
or they may see it but find in it quasi-mystical properties that 
may appear dogmatic or ideological. Hayek observes that
 
[m]any of the greatest things man has achieved are not 
the result of consciously directed thought, and still less 
the product of deliberately coordinated effort of many 
individuals, but of a process in which the individual 
plays a part which he can never fully understand. They 
are greater than any individual precisely because they 
result from the combination of knowledge more ex-
tensive than any single mind can master (Hayek, 1952, 
149-50).
That millions of people pursuing their own purposes 
and plans without central direction could result in anything 
other than utter chaos seems implausible: no design without 
a designer; large-scale order must thus be the result of large-
scale planning. That chaos does not generally result, and that 
societies and market economies not only function without 
detailed centralized direction, but for the most part function 
best without it, is testament to the supreme importance of 
this idea as a foundational insight into the nature of modern 
society and economic systems. 
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The human mind seems to have evolved to attribute 
any perceived order to the guiding intention of an ordering 
hand or mind, and thus to seek causal explanations or sto-
ries (Boyd, 2009). So there may be opportunity to develop a 
minor research program at the intersection of evolutionary 
psychology and behavioural economics to explore this sys-
tematic ‘anomaly’ (à la Kahneman, 2011). Call this ‘behav-
ioural microeconomics of spontaneous orders’; it may then 
underpin various attribution biases, systematic overconfi-
dence in entrepreneurial judgments, expectation formation, 
and many other choice anomalies.
3: CO-OPERATION 
The reason we care about spontaneous orders at all—which 
is to say the reason why we seek to better understand how 
they work and their range of application—is because of what 
they are not: namely, a spontaneous order is not the conse-
quence of coercive force. It is not an expression of individual 
power over others. A spontaneous order is a state of co-ordi-
nation that is achieved through mechanisms that are, in law, 
nature and game theory, co-operative. A spontaneous order 
is the outcome of a mutual co-operative strategy, that is, as 
diZerega notes, ‘based on certain broadly shared values that 
are simpler than the values actually motivating many people’. 
A spontaneous order is an unintentional co-operative 
solution that arises from agreement about rules, not out-
comes. It is a solution to a co-ordination problem that arises 
without recourse to force of command or acts of coercion. 
The price mechanism is both an efficient and a peaceful 
mechanism. There are also other efficient and peaceful ways 
to achieve order. Co-ordinated outcomes can also be realized 
through rule-governed voluntary collectives, such as when 
clubs or civil societies create public goods. Or it can occur 
when many people adopt the same behaviour, technology, 
institution or idea. In these instances, the order essentially 
exists in the correlated population of rules that agents carry. 
It exists dynamically in the institutional space of order pro-
vided by those rules.6 
The concept of a spontaneous order has long been as-
sociated with the order of the market, in which price signals 
co-ordinate economic activity without the need for central 
planning. It has also been noted that this spontaneous or-
der seemingly relies on institutional arrangements such as 
property rights that are provided by government, and there-
fore rely on its coercive powers. But as Ostrom (1990), Greif 
(1993), Anderson and Hill (2004), and Leeson (2008; 2010) 
among others show, there is considerable scope for the de-
velopment and enforcement of rules to govern co-operative 
behaviour without recourse to the state. This connection 
between the mechanisms of co-operation and spontaneous 
orders is at the forefront of modern science and is having a 
particularly strong impact in the reframing of the social sci-
ences (Nowak, 2010; Wilson, 2012).   
Theoretical, experimental and empirical findings are 
converging on a set of conditions that appear to be necessary 
for the emergence of co-operation in ‘collective-action’ or 
‘social-dilemma’ situations. These are: (1) low discount rates, 
patience, or long time horizons; (2) low information-sharing 
or communication costs; (3) equally strong agents; and (4) 
shared ideas about defection and how it should be punished 
(Leeson, 2008: 70). In the absence of these conditions, mu-
tual co-operation is not expected to emerge spontaneously. 
diZerega makes a similar observation, noting that ‘all spon-
taneous orders possess certain abstract features in common’ 
—‘all participants have equal status. All are equally subject to 
whatever rules must be followed. All are free to apply those 
rules to any project of their choosing’. He also recognizes 
that ‘these rules facilitate co-operation among strangers’. 
There is obvious overlap between these approaches as well as 
room for cross-fertilization: for example, in the understand-
ing of decentralized enforcement (or what is called ‘altruistic 
punishment’ in the evolutionary-games literature).
There are two main concepts of orders in the literature: 
first, that based on command incentive (for example, power 
or coercion); and second, that based on non-command in-
centive (for example, markets or other spontaneous orders). 
And there are two main concepts of spontaneous orders in 
the literature: that which is based on information (or com-
plexity); and that which is based on rules (or evolution). 
Spontaneous orders are co-operative orders. These are valu-
able in themselves because they are not coercive orders. 
Spontaneous orders are in several ways voluntary and non-
coercive. But they are also invariably rule-governed, rather 
than command-governed. They are better understood as 
rule systems than as communication systems; but in both 
cases they are co-operative systems.
4: INFORMATION & RULES 
Hayek’s most well-known paper, and by several accounts one 
of the most important papers in economics (Arrow et al., 
2011), is his 1945 essay—‘The use of knowledge in society’. 
It explains how the information contained in price signals 
enables vast numbers of economic agents to continuously 
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adapt not only to changes in the relative scarcity of different 
commodities, both locally and globally, but also to changes 
in the preferences and plans of others, all through mutual 
adaptation and without central direction. The result is the 
coordination of millions of individuals’ plans without any-
one doing the planning, a result also known as the spontane-
ous order of the market through the mechanism of the price 
system. Hayek (1945: 527) notes in passing that ‘[i]f it were 
the result of deliberate human design … this mechanism 
would have been acclaimed as one of the greatest triumphs 
of the human mind’. His point is that we don’t tend to value 
things, such as spontaneous orders, that can’t be traced to ra-
tional planning or individual construction. 
Hayek unpacks the spontaneous orders in the market-
price system by focusing on distributed information or 
knowledge. The centrepiece of Hayek’s (1945: 520) argument 
lies in recognizing that the economic problem is ultimately 
‘the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totali-
ty’ and, crucially, that there are ‘different kinds of knowledge’. 
There is scientific or technological knowledge – ‘which oc-
cupies now so prominent a place in public imagination that 
we tend to forget that it is not the only kind that is relevant’ 
– and there is local distributed ‘knowledge of particular cir-
cumstances of time and place’. For Hayek this second type 
of ‘very important but unorganized knowledge’ about local 
conditions and opportunities is key to understanding why 
the decentralized price system is superior to central plan-
ning. Following von Mises’ information-and-calculation-
based critique of socialism (1922/1951), Hayek argues that 
the price system enables a society to make effective use of 
distributed knowledge of the particular circumstances of 
time and place, something that is not just difficult but im-
possible in a centrally organized system.
Hayek and the Austrian school of economics (along 
with certain strands of post-Keynesian macroeconomics7) 
have emphasized that the fundamental economic problem is 
not so much an allocation problem (the textbook shibboleth 
‘the allocation of scarce resources’) but is properly under-
stood as a co-ordination problem as regards the co-ordination 
of distributed knowledge and individual plans. Prices carry 
information that embodies widely distributed knowledge as 
information that enables agents to adapt their own actions in 
response. A system of markets with variable prices is thus a 
kind of many-to-many communication network or system:
The most significant fact about this system is the econ-
omy of knowledge with which it operates, or how lit-
tle the individual participants need to know in order 
to be able to take the right action. … It is more than 
a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of 
machinery for registering change, or a system of tele-
communications which enables individual producers to 
watch merely the movement of a few pointers in order 
to adjust their activities to changes of which they never 
know more than is reflected in the price movement  
(Hayek, 1945: 527; italics added). 
The allocation-coordination distinction is important 
because if the economic problem is defined as an alloca-
tion problem and if the role of prices is to define the general 
equilibrium solution to this problem—as in textbook neo-
classical economics—then the socialists would have a point. 
Specifically, what economists such as Oskar Lange (1936; 
1937), Henry Dickenson (1933) and Abba Lerner (1937; 
1938) noted in the 1930s was that if we can compute those 
prices by some other means, then we don’t actually need the 
market-generated process; we can just go straight to the opti-
mal allocation using ‘shadow prices’ and the implementation 
of an optimal central plan. Hayek’s ‘The use of knowledge in 
society’ was a rebuttal to this claim by reasoning that there 
is no way the planners can get that information to compute 
those prices in the first place because most of it – ‘the par-
ticular circumstances of time and place’ – is distributed and 
subjective and cannot be centralized. This is why a market 
society co-ordinated by the price mechanism will work, and 
why any large complex society based on central planning 
will eventually fail (Boettke, 2000). 
The price mechanism is a massively parallel communi-
cation system that produces (or computes) the spontaneous 
order of the market. As Steve Horwitz explains:
Because so much of our knowledge is tentative, frag-
mented and tacit, we require the use of spontaneously 
evolved social institutions to generate social order. 
Spontaneous ordering processes are communication 
procedures that enable us to overcome our very narrow 
and partial views of the world and to make use of the 
differently partial and narrow knowledge that others 
possess (Horwitz, 2001: 91, italics added).
It enables the efficient and effective utilization of distrib-
uted knowledge through its embodiment in prices and the 
adaptive behaviour that price changes induce. This account 
that focuses on distributed and partially tacit knowledge, 
on prices as information signals, and on the communica-
tions system metaphor has become the dominant theoreti-
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cal account of the efficacy of the price mechanism and the 
market system. Peter Boettke (1990, italics added) explains 
that ‘early Hayek, as well as later Hayek, is concerned with 
the communicative function of social institutions in general, 
whether they are money prices within the economic system 
or the rules of behavior within social interaction. Exploring 
this communicative function is what motivates his research’.
This is not only in the development of work on mecha-
nism design (see for example Hurwicz, 1969; Myerson, 2009) 
but also as evidenced by the research program on informa-
tion asymmetries and bounded rationality, all of which pro-
ceeds from a computational and information-centred view 
of markets.
Most definitions of spontaneous order are in the Smith-
von Mises-Hayek tradition of decentralized information 
communication networks without a central co-ordinator. 
The price-mechanism model of co-ordination via informa-
tion feedback is almost canonical in the study of spontane-
ous orders. A related model emphasizes a different aspect 
of the process of spontaneous order emergence: the role 
of rule use, rule creation and rule copying (Dopfer, 2004; 
Dopfer and Potts 2008; 2013). Rule-use and rule-copying 
also produce a spontaneous order. This is ‘the use of society 
in knowledge’.
This approach is more explicitly evolutionary in the 
Darwinian sense of centring on the differential replica-
tion (variation and selection) of units of knowledge such 
as genes, technologies or rules (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Aldrich et al., 2008; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2011). It is also 
more explicitly modelled on theories of cultural and techno-
logical evolution (Hayek, 1973; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; 
Rogers, 1995; Ziman, 2001; Mesoudi, 2011). 
We may understand rules as the units of knowledge that 
compose a cultural, technological or economic order, in the 
sense of rules as the ordering instructions that govern indi-
vidual choice, action and behaviour (rules of choice, behav-
ioural heuristics), as well as rules that govern how people 
interact in organizations or shared or common rules that 
define institutions. We may also think of technology as rules 
for ordering matter-energy into particular forms to generate 
particular capabilities (Arthur, 2009). By rules, then, we refer 
to the knowledge that composes an economic, social, tech-
nological or cultural order and specifically to the idea that 
these rules have an origin, a point at which they are devel-
oped, and a trajectory by which they are adopted into a rele-
vant carrier population that may potentially stabilize at some 
level to form an institution. In the language of Dopfer et al. 
(2004) and Dopfer and Potts (2008), this ‘generic rule and its 
carrier population’ forms a ‘meso unit’: a macro-economy is 
an order of meso-units (Wagner, 2012). The order of a mac-
ro-economy is an order of rules fitting together, both in the 
connectionist or complex-systems sense of the rules fitting 
with other rules (Potts, 2000) and also in the Darwinian-
population sense of a population of rules coming into order. 
Rules are what evolve in the process of economic evolution 
and the order of the ‘market ecology’ is an order of rules. 
From this perspective, then, the spontaneous order of 
the market can be viewed from an evolutionary perspective 
that is centred on not only a given population and structure 
of rules. It is also centred on the process by which new rules 
originate and enter into the economic order, and on the 
evolutionary trajectory through which they are adopted by 
a carrier population, as well as on the effect of that process 
on existing rules, a process that Joseph Schumpeter (1945) 
famously characterized as ‘creative destruction’. The point 
of this emphasis on rules and the evolutionary process is to 
make clear the difference between a process of adaptation 
within a given set of rules or knowledge and a process of 
the adoption of new rules. In the first case, exemplified by 
Hayek’s ‘use of knowledge in society’, we are dealing with the 
outcome of a many-to-many communication network op-
erating through price signals that are processing distributed 
knowledge. In the second case, exemplified by Schumpeter’s 
creative destruction model of economic evolution, we are 
dealing with a process in which new ideas, rules or knowl-
edge enters into and transforms a system as the rule is origi-
nated, adopted and retained by a carrier population. It will 
often be the case that these two co-ordination processes oc-
cur simultaneously, but they are nevertheless different types 
of spontaneous order. Any endeavour to develop the theory 
of spontaneous order needs to make this distinction clear.    
Yet these ideas are often run together in the spontane-
ous-order tradition, where there is a tendency to think of 
distributed knowledge and changes as being caused by ex-
ogenous shocks, as well as to think of the re-coordination 
that the price mechanism provides as carrying over to the 
‘exogenous shocks’ of new technology or new ideas.8 There 
is a tendency to think of these things (new information, new 
knowledge and new ideas) as more or less the same concept 
at the limit, but there is a crucial difference. In short, the first 
requires adaptation (doing something different, requiring 
reaction); the second requires adoption (doing something 
new, requiring learning). With novelty, the problem is not 
with whether something has changed and what to do about 
it; the problem is about how to act in a situation never before 
VoLuME 1  |  ISSuE 1  2013
CO
SM
O
S + TA
X
IS
36
encountered, a situation in which learning is required about 
how to act at all. 
There are broadly two solutions to the challenge of learn-
ing how to act in a new situation: (1) develop a new strategy; 
or (2) copy someone else. As if to parallel Hayek’s argument 
regarding knowledge as technical knowledge and knowledge 
of time and place (where the common premise was that all 
knowledge was technical knowledge), the basic problem 
with modern economics is that it assumes that any situa-
tion involving novelty necessarily involves developing a new 
strategy, and moreover that this is a costless process. That is, 
it presumes that the challenge of learning is met by the agent 
acting rationally, and without reference to the actions or the 
examples of others. But while economists tend to model ra-
tional behaviour this way, it is actually far from obvious that 
this is itself a model of rational behaviour. Specifically, once 
we account for the opportunity costs involved, the frequency 
with which novel situations or commodities are met, and 
the common situation that some other agents have already 
invested time and resources in figuring out what to do, imi-
tation or copying can be, in the language of Vernon Smith, 
an ecologically rational strategy (see also Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Potts et al., 2008; Ormerod, 2012). 
This is the use of society in knowledge, which is an idea that 
Hayek himself wrote about in terms of cultural group selec-
tion in which ‘successful practices get passed on through tra-
dition, learning and imitation’ (Caldwell, 2000: 6). 
Under certain conditions copying is an effective strategy, 
both individually and globally, and results in a grown order 
that through differential adoption effectively co-ordinates 
new rules into the economic order. This is of course not a 
novel argument; copying mechanisms underpins most theo-
ries of cultural evolution. However, the concept has not yet 
been properly integrated into studies of spontaneous order, 
and nor has the full implications of this generalization from 
information to knowledge been fully elaborated in terms of 
subject matter, empiricism, theory, and analysis. There are 
many definitions of spontaneous order but these are largely 
in terms of information and systems co-ordination. I argue 
that a more general approach should be based on rules and 
on a comprehensive rule classification. It should also be cen-
tred on rule-copying. This explains how spontaneous orders 
are grown, and accounts for this in the presence of novelty. 
A special case is then when there is no rule-copying or rule 
dynamics, and just decentralized co-ordination through 
positive and negative feedback, such as through the price 
mechanism. 
5: TWO DEFINITIONS OF SPONTANEOUS  
    ORDER
From Adam Smith to Vernon Smith the standard account 
of a spontaneous order is of a process of mutual adaptation 
that is facilitated by the information economy of the price 
mechanism. The price mechanism is herein understood as 
a communication system that can efficiently process wide-
ly distributed knowledge and information (Hayek, 1945). 
Agents can co-ordinate their individual plans by paying at-
tention to price movements alone, and without the require-
ment of any central controlling agency. In this account, 
spontaneous order means ‘order without design’, but specifi-
cally refers to an outcome produced by the price system. The 
price system is said to be a complex evolutionary mechanism 
that co-ordinates the production of the economic order. 
Several partially overlapping yet analytically distinct ap-
proaches to the study of spontaneous orders are embedded 
in this definition. There is a communication-network defini-
tion that emphasizes the solution to the distributed-knowl-
edge problem and the role of price signals as a co-ordination 
mechanism. This emphasizes information feedback pro-
cesses among individual agents and the limited knowledge 
of each agent. A different emphasis is in complexity-based 
approaches to the study of spontaneous orders, which tend 
to focus on the systems properties of the connections and in-
teractions between the agents, and on the emergent proper-
ties of the system because of these structures of interactions. 
This also includes agent-based computational approaches, 
using rule-based agents interacting on complex networks. 
Further along this path is the evolutionary and institutional 
approach that pushes the agents and information further 
into the background and brings the population dynamics of 
rules or knowledge into the foreground.
As such there are two standard approaches to spontane-
ous order, broadly in terms of whether the focus is on the 
outcomes (i.e. the order per se, or the state of co-ordination 
or equilibrium), or on the processes, mechanisms and in-
stitutions that generate or constitute those outcomes. This 
difference is in practice hard to separate, and indeed James 
Buchanan9 has explained that it doesn’t even make sense to 
speak of an order separated from the process by which it 
is arrived at or discovered. In a brilliant short note entitled 
‘Order defined in the process of its emergence’ he explains:
I want to argue that the “order” of the market emerg-
es only from the process of voluntary exchange among 
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the participating individuals. The “order” is, itself, de-
fined as the outcome of the  process  that generates it. 
The “it,” the allocation-distribution result, does not, 
and cannot, exist independently of the trading pro-
cess. Absent this process, there is and can be no “order” 
(Buchanan, 1986b: 73-4; italics in original).
That the outcome and the process are in a sense the 
same phenomenon has meant that definitions of spontane-
ous orders can shift back and forth between the mechanism 
or process and the outcome. A line of thinking from Adam 
Smith through John Stuart Mill, Carl Menger, Frank Knight 
and F. A. Hayek centres on the price mechanism—and the 
study of markets and market-like situations that compute 
and communicate price or price-like information—as the 
core of the study of spontaneous order. In the modern form, 
this is then associated with the workings of a complex sys-
tem (Wagner, 2008). Vriend (2002), Lavoie (1989) and Potts 
(2000) associate Hayek’s view with complexity, and Barkley 
Rosser (2012: 125) explains that ‘[i]n Hayek’s view, emer-
gence and complexity are essentially the same thing, given 
his linking of the concept of complexity to the emergentist 
tradition of Mill, Lewes and Morgan’.
But a wider definition views the spontaneous order of 
the market economy as the product of an evolutionary pro-
cess operating broadly over organizations, institutions and 
technologies (Schumpeter, 1942; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Dopfer and Potts, 2008; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010). Here 
the price mechanism is just one of several mechanisms in-
volved in this evolutionary rule-based process. Steven 
Horwitz explains that spontaneous orders
comprise practices, rules, institutions, and so forth 
that have developed not because human actors ra-
tionally foresaw their likely benefits and deliberately, 
consciously constructed them, but rather because they 
are unintended consequences of various human ac-
tors’ pursuit of their own purposes and plans (Horwitz, 
2001: 82).
Despite this, the concept of a spontaneous order has 
come to be synonymous with that of a co-ordinating rule 
or convention that has emerged through use, salience and 
selection, rather than being deliberately designed. A spon-
taneous order is associated with the co-ordinating rule that 
generates the spontaneous order. This is the meaning of 
spontaneous order in evolutionary game theory, such as 
Thomas Schelling’s focal points (Schelling 1960), or the no-
tion of conventions or institutions as equilibrium solution 
concepts in a game, such as an evolutionary stable strat-
egy (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Sugden, 1989; Young, 
1993; Aoki, 2007). 
A related meaning of spontaneous order is as an evo-
lutionary process, and specifically a variation-and-selection 
mechanism, that blindly produces an ordered outcome 
though the twin mechanisms of variety generation and se-
lection against variants that do not meet some minimum 
fitness criterion. The order here is attributed not to the in-
dividual elements and their interactions, but to the popula-
tion as a whole and its associations with other populations. 
This ‘ecological’ or ‘macro’ ordering represents a state of or-
der and co-ordination that is not attributable to design or 
intention but comes about through distributed interactions. 
Schumpeterian creative destruction is an example, as is the 
Austrian (liquidationist) theory of the business cycle.  
A spontaneous order in the more classical sense refers 
to a broad phenomenal outcome of a state of co-ordination 
between many independent agents or parts such that they 
fit together. The order of the market, in the sense of Adam 
Smith’s invisible-hand metaphor, fits this meaning, and more 
generally this refers to Hayek’s notion of the ‘Great Society’, 
or the ‘extended order’, or of Popper’s (1945) ‘Open Society’. 
This includes not only a co-ordination of actions but also of 
plans and therefore of expectations:10
 Living as members of society and dependent for the 
satisfaction of most of our needs on various forms of 
cooperation with others, we depend for the effective 
pursuit of our aims clearly on the correspondence of 
the expectations concerning the actions of others on 
which our plans are based with what they really do 
(Hayek, 1973: 36).
Hayek (1978) updated Smith’s invisible hand with the 
concept of a spontaneous order. In the past few decades 
Hayek has himself been updated with the concepts of self-
organization or the theory of complex adaptive systems 
(CAS). While the CAS framework has developed from a 
number of lines including non-linear dynamics, agent-based 
modelling, computational simulation, network theory, and 
other analytic domains, there is an acknowledged debt to the 
work of Hayek and others in introducing the idea of emer-
gent order as a unifying concept. This is evident in neurosci-
ence (Hayek, 1952), markets (Hayek, 1945) and the extended 
order of society (Hayek, 1973; see also Andersson, 2008). 
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Complex systems theory offers a sharper conception of 
analytic concepts, including agent, rule, interactions payoff 
and networks (or spaces of interactions, see Potts, 2000), and 
also descriptors such as the notion of self-organized critical-
ity (Bak, 1999), emergence and the ubiquity of power laws as 
a signature of self-organization. Complex systems theory has 
also furnished a suite of off-the-shelf models for the study 
of CAS, such as cellular automata, Boolean networks, ran-
dom graphs, and, more recently, increasingly sophisticated 
and easy-to-use simulation platforms and analysis packages. 
These factors have sharpened up the analytic conception, 
modelling approaches and empirical research into the study 
of spontaneous orders understood as belonging to the class 
of CAS. 
A central insight, which also can be traced to Hayek, 
concerns what it means to describe a spontaneous order as 
complex. For Hayek and others, the main distinction was be-
tween a complex and a simple system, whereupon a hierar-
chical order (such as an organization) was actually a simple 
system because it could be described and understood. As 
Steve Horwitz explains, referencing Hayek’s (1973) discus-
sion of made versus spontaneous orders:
Organisations are fairly simple structures, with a degree 
of complexity that the maker of the order can survey. 
In addition, organisations are usually directly perceiv-
able by inspection and serve the speciﬁc purpose(s) 
of those who constructed them. Spontaneous orders, 
such as the market, are, by contrast, capable of any de-
gree of complexity, they are rule based and their struc-
tures may not be obvious, plus they serve no particular 
purpose; rather, they serve the multitudinous purposes 
of those who participate in them (Horwitz, 2005: 671). 
CAS theory has provided a deeper understanding of 
what it actually means to describe a spontaneous order as 
complex. In particular, complex systems theories distinguish 
complex not from simple but from complicated. A compli-
cated system will have many parts or elements composing 
it. It is informationally complicated because there is a lot to 
know. However, a system with only a few parts could be a 
complex system. The crucial factor determining complex-
ity concerns the interactions (not the number of parts). A 
complex system is complex because of feedback, and that 
feedback is a property or structure of the rules that govern 
the system. Complex systems are complex because they set 
up rule systems that drive information feedback between the 
elements (and whether there are a few or millions doesn’t re-
ally matter).  
It should also be clear that the study of spontaneous 
orders, and equally that of complex adaptive systems, is 
ultimately a study of rules and rule systems, and it is this 
ontology and method that distinguishes the spontaneous 
order approach from that of constructivist rationalism. An 
‘extended order’ is a rule system. All spontaneous orders are 
rule systems because their governance structure is a process 
of rules rather than of hierarchic organization. For Hayek:
it is only as a result of individuals observing certain 
common rules that a group of men can live together 
in those orderly relations which we call society (1973: 
95).
Boettke elaborates: 
all we need are rules or social institutions (conven-
tions, symbols) that produce mutually reinforcing sets 
of expectations to maintain a degree of social order, 
and these rules or institutions must serve as guides to 
individuals so they may orient their actions (Boettke, 
1990: 76).
The spontaneous-order literature (for example the jour-
nal Studies in Emergent Order) does two things that differ 
from the above. First, it draws a somewhat different empha-
sis on the properties of a spontaneous order that focus on the 
properties of the elements as human agents with moral di-
mensions (a focus that Adam Smith also made). Specifically, 
it emphasizes the properties of the agents as independent, in 
the sense of pursuing their own plans without regard to those 
of others (and vice versa), except to the extent that other 
people’s plans will impact on their own (and vice versa), thus 
recognizing that there is a co-ordination problem that needs 
to be solved. It has to be solved in such a way that it mini-
mizes the extent to which each individual needs to concern 
themselves with the plans of others. Institutional solutions 
that maximize individual autonomy and minimize public 
sharing of information and coercion are to be preferred. 
6: PRIVATE CHOICE AND PUBLIC  
    INFORMATION
The genius of Hayek’s (1937; 1945) contribution to the theo-
ry of the market order was to see clearly how it worked with 
distributed private information:
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The peculiar character of the problem of a rational eco-
nomic order is determined precisely by the fact that 
the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must 
make use never exists in concentrated or integrated 
form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the sep-
arate individuals possess (Hayek, 1945: 519).
This became a critique of central planning when it was 
shown that planning required all information to be known 
in its entirety to one central mind. Hayek’s point was that 
information does not need to be centralized, but rather that 
market mechanisms work to co-ordinate decentralized infor-
mation and knowledge into a single variable of price. Market 
prices aggregate distributed information and knowledge and 
reflect the relative scarcity and value of a good. Based on this 
market information (either its level or its changes), the dis-
tributed actions of agents throughout the system can be con-
tinuously re-coordinated without central planning: 
It is the source of the superiority of the market order, 
and the reason why it regularly displaces other types of 
order, that in the resulting allocation of resources more 
of the knowledge of particular facts will be utilized 
which exists only dispersed among uncounted persons, 
than any one person can possess (Hayek, 1989: 4). 
The decentralized model triggered a second observation 
– closely bound up with the ‘Austrian’ subjectivism of hu-
man action – that knowledge could remain entirely private, 
with the only public information being the emergent market 
price. Again, this was a powerful insight because it showed 
that the minimal information conditions (private subjec-
tive knowledge, public price) were also sufficient conditions: 
nothing else was required for the market mechanism to co-
ordinate the efficient allocation of resources. In the Hayekian 
framework, private (or local) choice and action explains 
emergent market order by its effect on ‘public’ (or global) 
price (Hirshleifer, 1971). 
The key point is that no agent need observe other 
agents’ actual choices and actions—that is, they attain no 
benefit from doing so—as it is sufficient to observe only the 
price, which, as an aggregator of distributed knowledge and 
information, enables an agent to observe in a single piece 
of information the choices and actions of a great number of 
other agents (Angeletos and Pavanm, 2007). The econom-
ics of market co-ordination are thus, as a principle of suf-
ficiency, wholly separate from the public or social context 
of choice and action: that other agents’ choices can or might 
be observed is immaterial to the mechanics of the emergent 
market order. 
In turn, the economics of ‘observing other peoples’ 
choices’ has gone in a different set of directions. The semi-
nal theory on choice observation concerned the econom-
ics and sociology of consumption and the use of observed 
(public) choice in competitive social signalling (Veblen, 1899; 
Leibenstein, 1950; 1976). Here, the information was carried 
directly in publicly revealed or displayed choice (via public 
consumption); price information was thereby inverted. The 
concern here is social competition. 
A second game-theoretic line concerned observation of 
others’ choices in order to extract private information about 
their strategic intentions: in its simplest form, about the stra-
tegic ‘type’ of the observed agent (for example co-operator 
or defector). This does not concern the effects of distribut-
ed choice, but specific observation of other agents or agent 
populations and it is thus concerned with information-sig-
nalling. Prices enter parametrically via the pay-off matrix 
rather than being key information. The concern is social co-
operation.  
A third line of choice observation concerned social 
learning in which direct observation of others’ choices re-
vealed information about the costs and benefits of adoption 
of new ideas and technologies. This is neither essentially 
competitive nor co-operative but evolutionary in that it re-
lates to the public externalities associated with the benefits 
of learning by observation and imitation (Dosi et al., 2005; 
Apesteguia et al., 2007; Rendell, 2010). This concerns social 
evolution.
These three lines of economic analysis of observed 
choice have all been extensively developed. They have con-
tributed much to our understanding of economic co-ordi-
nation and dynamics. However, none of these lines explicitly 
seeks to generalize to Hayek’s seminal formulation of private 
choice over a distributed space beyond its minimal suffi-
ciency conditions; that is, to examine the implications of 
observation of other peoples’ choices and prices working 
in parallel. I want to argue that this is the logical direction 
for spontaneous-order studies to go because this enables us 
to develop a unified approach to the study of spontaneous 
orders that integrates both the distributed knowledge prob-
lem (and the role of the price mechanism in solving the co-
ordination problem) and also the new knowledge problem 
(and the role of the copying mechanism in solving that co-
ordination problem). 
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The reason that the copying mechanism is a logical ex-
tension of the price mechanism is simply because there is in-
formation in other people’s choices, and when copying the 
rules used by other people to make choices over novel cir-
cumstances, the copier gets access to that information with-
out even necessarily knowing what it is. That information 
can remain private, while only the choice rule is publically 
copied. 
NOTES
1 Although, as we will see below, the origins of this idea date back 
to the early 18th century (Barry, 1982).
2 A phrase first used by Charles Darwin.
3 This is the reason that I do not follow so readily in the direction 
of Habermas, or in the accommodation of Hayek and Marx. 
Rather I see this going in a different direction that is more 
toward Michael Oakeshott, John Rawls and James Buchanan; for 
example, in respect of emergent constitutional orders.
4 Peter Boettke (1990: 61) suggests the overarching theme of 
Hayek’s research program is: ‘how do social institutions work, 
through the filter of the human mind, to co-ordinate human 
affairs’?
5 Although Buchanan (1986) argues for the restriction of the 
concept of spontaneous orders to price systems.
6 Arthur (2009) makes a similar claim about technology.
7 In particular, see the work of Bob Clower, Axel Leijonhufvud, 
George Shackle, Brian Loasby and Peter Earl (Lachmann, 1976).
8 This is most clearly apparent in, for example, so-called 
‘endogenous growth theory’ (Romer, 1990).
9 Buchanan also usefully explained why we should prefer the term 
emergent order to spontaneous order, but we will not take that up 
here. 
10 See the work of Austrian/Post-Keynesians such as G. L. S. 
Shackle, Robert Clower, Axel Leijonhufvud and Brian Loasby on 
macro co-ordination, epistemics and complex systems (see Potts, 
2000).
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